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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1948

No. 339

GROSS INCOME TAX DIVISION, STATE OF INDIANA,

Petitioner,

vs.

R. CARL QUICK,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

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INDEX

	Page
Basis for jurisdiction	1
Reasons for requesting writ	2
Questions presented	2
Summary statement	3
Opinion below	1
Reasons for granting writ	2
I. The Supreme Court of Indiana in this case has decided a federal question of substance not theretofore determined by this Court	5, 6
II. The Supreme Court of Indiana has decided a federal question of substance in a way probably not in accord with the applicable decisions of this Court	5, 7
III. The Supreme Court of Indiana in this case has decided an important question of state and federal law in a way that is untenable	5, 10
IV. The Supreme Court of Indiana has decided an important question of federal law which should be settled in this Court	5, 10
Appendix "A":	
Indiana Gross Income Regulation 1808	21
Indiana Gross Income Regulation 1812	21
Indiana Gross Income Regulation 1818	21
Indiana Gross Income Regulation 1821	21
Appendix "B":	
Indiana Gross Income Tax Act—Section 1 (m)	22

Citation of Authorities

American Mfg. Co. v. *St. Louis* (1919), 250 U. S. 459, 63 L. Ed. 1084	19
Bacon v. *Illinois* (1913), 227 U. S. 504, 57 L. Ed. 615	7

Page

Caskey Baking Co. v. *Virginia* (1941), 313 U. S. 117, 85 L. Ed. 1223 ..... 7, 9

Central Greyhound Lines v. *Mealey* (1948), 92 L. Ed. (Adv.) 1235, 1237, 68 S. Ct. 1260, 1265 ..... 12, 15

Chicago Board of Trade v. *Olsen* (1923), 262 U. S. 1, 67 L. Ed. 839 8

Collector v. *Day* (1871), 11 Wall. 113, 124, 78 U. S. 122 10

Department of Treasury v. *Allied Mills* (1942), 220 Ind. 340 Aff'd. (1943), 318 U. S. 740, 87 L. Ed. 1120 16

Department of Treasury v. *Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co.* (1941), 313 U. S. 252, 85 L. Ed. 1313 ..... 16, 17

Department of Treasury v. *Wood Preserving Co.* (1941), 313 U. S. 62, 85 L. Ed. 1188 16

Dobbins v. *Erie County* (1842), 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. Ed. 1022 11

Freeman v. *Hewit* (1946), 329 U. S. 249, 91 L. Ed. 265 ..... 7, 16

General Trading Co. v. *State Tax Commission* (1944), 322 U. S. 335, 337, 88 L. Ed. 1309 14

Graves v. *New York* (1939), 306 U. S. 466, 83 L. Ed. 927 11

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock et al. v. *Dept. of Treasury* (1943), 133 Fed. (2d) 212; certiorari denied, 320 U. S. 746 16

Helvering v. *Gerhardt* (1938), 304 U. S. 405; 82 L. Ed. 1427 11

International Harvester v. *Dept. of Treasury* (1944), 322 U. S. 340, 88 L. Ed. 1313 ..... 6, 16

J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. *Storen* (1938), 304 U. S. 307, 82 L. Ed. 1365 ..... 6, 15, 16, 17

Liggett v. *Lee* (1933), 288 U. S. 517, 77 L. Ed. 929 7

McCulloch v. *Maryland* (1819), 4 Wheat. 316, 431, 4 L. Ed. 579 11

Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. *Stone* (1948), 68 S. Ct. 1475, 1482, 92 L. Ed. 1409, and cases cited (N. 16) 14, 15, 19

Miles v. *Dept. of Treasury* (1935), 209 Ind. 172; 188, 199, N. E. 372 14

Page

Minnesota v. *Blasius* (1933), 290 U. S. 1, 78 L. Ed. 131 7
N.L.R.B. v. *Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.* (1937), 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. Ed. 893 8
Panhandle Oil Co. v. *Mississippi, etc.* (1928), 277 U. S. 218, 223, 224; 72 L. Ed. 857, 859 (dissent) 11
Stafford v. *Wallace* (1922), 258 U. S. 495, 66 L. Ed. 735 8
Storen v. *J. D. Adams Mfg. Co.* (1937), 212 Ind. 343, 351, 7 N. E. (2d) 941 14
Swift & Co. v. *United States* (1905), 196 U. S. 375, 49 L. Ed. 518 8
Texas v. *White* (1869), 7 Wall. 700, 725, 74 U. S. 227 10
United States v. *Sullivan* (1948), 68 S. Ct. 331, 92 L. Ed. 305 8
Utah P. & L. Co. v. *Pfost* (1932), 286 U. S. 165, 76 L. Ed. 1038 19
Weston v. *Charleston* (1829), 2 Pet. 449, 472, 473, 7 L. Ed. 481, 489, 490 11
Wiloil Corp. v. *Pennsylvania* (1935), 294 U. S. 169, 79 L. Ed. 838 ..... 7, 9

CITATION OF STATUTES

Title 28 U.S.C., Sections 1257 and 2101 4
Acts of Indiana General Assembly: 4
Indiana Gross Income Tax Act, 1933, Chapter 50 4
Indiana Gross Income Tax Act, 1937, as amended, Chapter 117 4
Indiana Gross Income Tax Act, 1940, as amended, Chapter 140 4
Indiana Gross Income Tax Act, 1941, as amended, Chapter 144 4
Burns Indiana Statutes, 1933, Section 64-2601–2632 (1943 Replacement) 4
Indiana Gross Income Tax Act, 1933, Section 1 (m) (Appendix B) 22

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vs.

R. CARL QUICK,

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

The State of Indiana, by and through its Gross Income Tax Division, prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana entered in the above-entitled cause on the 25th day of June, 1948, affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court for the 41st Judicial District of Indiana.

Opinion Below

The opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court in this cause is unreported as yet, but will be found at page 33 of the record herein, and may also be found unofficially reported at 78 N. E. (2d) 871 of the West Reporter System.

Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Title 28, U. S. C., Sections 1257 and 2101.

The Reasons for Requesting Writ

This cause is one in which a decision of the highest court of the state draws in question the validity of a statute of that state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, more particularly Article I, Section 8, in reference to Interstate Commerce; also, for the reason that the Supreme Court of Indiana has decided the above, a federal question of substance not theretofore determined by this Court, and has decided it in a way probably not in accord with the applicable decisions of this Court.

Questions Presented

The questions presented are these:

A. When a farmer raises cattle and/or farm produce generally, and securing transportation facilities, transported such goods into another state and sold them therein—was such activity one of interstate commerce, thus rendering a tax on the income received from such sale, a burden on interstate commerce?

B. Does the prohibition against state regulation of interstate commerce by means of taxation extend to the whole functional area known as the "flow" of commerce, or is such prohibition directed against regulation of the traditional intercourse of the commerce itself?

Or, putting the same question in different form:

Is the state to be prevented from levying upon events otherwise taxable because such events occur or exist anywhere in the broad field in which the trend of modern

decisions indicates the Federal Government has the power to legislate, by virtue of the constitutional interstate commerce powers?

C. Does a state tax on gross income received within the State from goods sold out-of-state lay an improper burden on interstate commerce where the tax is properly apportioned in respect to income received from similar transactions within the state?

Summary Statement

This case originated in the Circuit Court for the 41st Judicial District for the State of Indiana. It is a suit by a taxpayer citizen of Indiana seeking to recover sums of money allegedly wrongfully paid, and illegally collected by the Gross Income Tax Division under the statutory taxing act. The act in question and the procedure thereunder, provides that timely petition for refund may be filed with the Gross Income Tax Division for hearing and administrative action thereon; and upon adverse decision, timely suit may be instituted by such an aggrieved taxpayer in the *nisi prius* courts of the state.

Respondent Quick instituted such a suit and had Judgment. The State of Indiana, Gross Income Tax Division, appealed such decision to the Supreme Court of Indiana, which is the highest court of last resort in the state. Respondent charged, in the original action below, that the imposition of the tax provided under the Gross Income Tax Act of Indiana was unconstitutional in that it was in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, since it sought to levy a tax on respondent's gross income received from the sale of livestock and/or farm produce in interstate commerce (R. p. 4).

The petitioner, State of Indiana, below, filed answer maintaining that the acts of respondent, and his transactions,

were not those of interstate commerce, and the taxation of the gross income received therefrom was not within the prohibition of the Interstate Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. (R. pp. 6, 7.)

Both the trial courts and the Indiana Supreme Court decided the cause in favor of respondent taxpayer. (R. p. 8 & p. 38.)

The Tax Act in question is the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933, as amended, Acts of the General Assembly 1933, Chapter 50; Acts 1937, Chapter 117; Acts 1940, Chapter 140; Acts 1941, Chapter 144; also found in Burns' Annotated Indiana Statutes, 1933 Ed., Sec. 64-2601-2632 (1943 Replacement).

This is the same Gross Income Tax Act which has made its appearance in this court before, but not in the sense that it is called into question by the Indiana Supreme Court decision sought to be reviewed herein.

The goods (cattle and/or farm produce) sold were transported by seller, respondent herein, to the place of sale in another state, with no prior order, no buyer in sight, received and held at the destination with title still in respondent, subject to the control, use, or disposition of taxpayer and/or his agents. The sale which produced the gross income concerned in this cause, then, occurred at a subsequent time and after an elapsed interval, during which buyers were sought and offers solicited. (R. p. 13.)

Reasons for Granting Writ

I

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA IN THIS CASE HAS DECIDED A FEDERAL QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THIS COURT.

II

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA HAS DECIDED A FEDERAL QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.

III

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA IN THIS CASE HAS DECIDED AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW IN A WAY THAT IS UNTENABLE.

IV

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA HAS DECIDED AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW WHICH SHOULD BE SETTLED IN THIS COURT.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I

The Supreme Court of Indiana in This Case Has Decided a Federal Question of Substance Not Theretofore Determined by This Court.

Is a state prohibited from taxing events which may be subject to Congressional legislation under the interstate commerce powers? The Indiana Supreme Court has so stated. (R. p. 33.) Petitioner seeks a reversal of such a holding: Where a taxpayer transported property to a market in another state and there, without prior order, sought a buyer and subsequently, on finding a buyer, effected a sale of the property; were the gross receipts from such sale, after transportation, sales costs and commissions were deducted, exempt from taxation by the state of taxpayer's residence as gross income received from interstate commerce? The Indiana Supreme Court decided in the affirmative. Petitioner contends the answer should be in the negative.

This court has previously held that gross receipts are exempted from the incidence of Indiana's Gross Income Tax Law where the goods were manufactured or produced for sale in interstate commerce and there sold and delivered interstate on prior order.

J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. *Storen* (1938), 304 U. S. 307; 82 L. ed. 1365;

International Harvester Co. v. *Dept. of Treasury* (1944), 322 U. S. 340; 88 L. ed. 1313.

Also, it has been held that property (stock certificates) sold in another state through an exchange, and delivered interstate pursuant to prior order, created a transaction, the

gross receipts from which are income from interstate commerce within the protection of Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution.

Freeman v. *Hewit* (1946), 329 U. S. 249; 91 L. ed. 265.

This court has not decided the question of the taxability by a state of gross income received by a resident taxpayer who transported his goods to an out-of-state market, and after depositing them, there elected to make a sale which produced such income.

Petitioner urges this Court that such question is of paramount importance to the future as well as present administration of its taxing powers.

II

The Supreme Court of Indiana Has Decided a Federal Question of Substance in a Way Probably Not in Accord With the Applicable Decisions of This Court.

In often repeated statements, this court has held that interstate commerce is terminated when the interstate movement has ended and the goods have come to rest at their destination, and that subsequent transactions are local events which will support otherwise valid state or local taxes.

Bacon v. *Illinois* (1913) 227 U. S. 504; 57 L. ed. 615;
Liggett v. *Lee* (1933) 288 U. S. 517; 77 L. ed. 929;
Minnesota v. *Blazius* (1933) 290 U. S. 1; 78 L. ed. 131;
Wiloil Corp. v. *Pennsylvania* (1935) 294 U. S. 169; 79 L. ed 838;
Caskey Baking Co. v. *Virginia* (1941) 313 U. S. 117; 85 L. ed. 1223.

Numerous decisions of this Court define an area of interstate commerce for the purpose of supporting or limiting

the power of Congress to legislate in the discharge of its function of Federal regulation. Such decisions tend to create an area aptly described as the "current of commerce", or the "flow of commerce", and served to extend the powers of the Federal government over a wide range not substantially a part of the limited field commonly understood under the term "interstate commerce" as technically defined.

United States v. *Sullivan* (1948), 68 Sup. Ct. 331; 92 L. ed. 305;

N. L. R. B. v. *Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.* (1937) 301 U. S. 1; 81 L. ed. 893;

Chicago Board of Trade v. *Olsen* (1923) 262 U. S. 1, 67 L. ed. 839;

Stafford v. *Wallace* (1922) 258 U. S. 495; 66 L. ed. 735;

Swift & Co. v. *United States* (1905) 196 U. S. 375; 49 L. ed. 518.

In *Chicago Board of Trade* v. *Olsen* (1922) 262 U. S. 1, 67 L. ed. 839, the power of Congress to regulate was upheld in the trading of grain futures, where no actual interstate movement was contemplated. In *United States* v. *Sullivan* (1948), 68 Sup. Ct. 331, 92 L. ed. (Adv.) 305, the efficacy of Congressional regulation was upheld at a time months after the interstate movement had ended. In *NLRB* v. *Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, (1937) 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. ed. 893, a purely local event concerning employment and employee relations, was held subject to legislation. In all these cases the impact of the legislation concerned was placed at a point far before or behind any activity traditionally defined as interstate commerce, but the legislation was sustained on the ground of the power of Congress to legislate in areas of the "flow of commerce" because events in those areas do affect, or have the power to affect, interstate commerce itself.

However, when one comes to the question of prohibitions against the states placing a burden on commerce, the constitutional prohibitions contained in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, are found to apply to interstate commerce itself as traditionally and technically defined. In *Minnesota* v. *Blasius* (1933) 290 U. S. 1, 78 L. ed. 131, a local tax on cattle was sustained though the cattle stood at the time in the stockyards, which place, and the cattle themselves, were doubtless subject to various forms of Federal regulation under the power of Congress to legislate in areas which "affect commerce." Similar results have been reached in several decisions of this Court which stand as guiding law in such matters.

Caskey Baking Co. v. *Virginia* (1941) 313 U. S. 117; 85 L. Ed. 1223;

Wiloil Corp. v. *Pennsylvania* (1935) 294 U. S. 169; 79 L. ed. 838.

The prohibitions against state taxation of gross income received from interstate commerce found in Article I, Section 8, do not, apparently, and should not, extend to all events and transactions found in the areas "affecting commerce." The several decisions of this Court strongly indicate that such events are within the sphere of constitutionally valid state taxation. The decision of the Indiana Supreme Court below extends the constitutional prohibition as a barrier between the state's power to tax and all events or transactions which are now, or may in the future be, within the areas which affect commerce. It would seem from the opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court, that wherever the Congress may legislate, the state may not tax. Petitioner submits that such a theory is contrary to all legal concepts on which our federal institutions are based, and that such a decision should not be permitted to stand.

III

The Supreme Court of Indiana in This Case Has Decided an Important Question of State and Federal Law in a Way That Is Untenable.

The existence of the states is still a necessary element of our federalism, and where the exercise of a state's functions can be constitutionally upheld this Court will support and defend that state's existence. Such discharge of its duty by this Court has ample historic background.

> "• • • the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government."
>
> *Texas* v. *White* (1869), 7 Wall. 700, 725; 74 U. S. 227.
>
> See also *Collector* v. *Day* (1871) 11 Wall. 113, 124; 78 U. S. 122.

The limitations on Indiana's power to obtain revenue from its Gross Income Tax have been adequately delineated in previous decisions of this Court. A far reaching prohibition as extensive as that laid down in the decision and opinion of the Court below in this cause would strike a most serious blow to the financial competence of the states. The Indiana Supreme Court's interpretation of the previous decisions of this Court is erroneous in its import and its review is most vital.

IV

The Supreme Court of Indiana Has Decided an Important Question of Federal Law Which Should Be Settled by This Court.

A

A State Tax Touching Interstate Commerce Is Not Necessarily an Unconstitutional Burden Thereon

For a long duration the decisions of this Court upheld previously laid down prohibitions against the attempts

of the States to tax instrumentalities and functionaries of the Federal government and, likewise, taxation by the Federal government of State instrumentalities. With two governments having authority within the same territory, the power of either to cripple the other's operations needed restriction. Such conditions were the background for the origin of the theoretical pronouncement that "the power to tax is the power to destroy".

McCulloch v. *Maryland* (1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 431; 4 L. ed. 579;

Weston v. *Charleston* (1829) 2 Pet. 449, 472, 473; 7 L. ed. 481, 489, 490;

Dobbins v. *Erie County* (1842) 16 Pet. 435; 10 L. ed. 1022.

Growing financial needs of the respective governments created a pressure under which the decisions conferring such broad and reciprocal immunities received constant review and dissent. That the need for protection of the State and/or the Federal government from the destruction or crippling effect of each other's taxing power required respective total immunity, is no longer the law.

Graves v. *New York* (1939) 306 U. S. 466; 83 L. ed. 927;

Helvering v. *Gerhardt* (1938) 304 U. S. 405; 82 L. ed. 1427,

and the mandate of this Court with the facts of each case in view, can protect against a possible destructive tax or permit an otherwise valid tax, non-destructive in fact. The power to tax is no longer the power to destroy.

Panhandle Oil Co. v. *Mississippi, etc.* (1928) 277 U. S. 218, 223, 224; 72 L. ed. 857, 859 (dissent).

The prohibitions implicit in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution are likewise for the protection of a co-existing government from destructive action; thus through the supremacy of the Federal government in its

sphere of power over interstate commerce, the Federal union is much more secure. Interstate commerce must be protected from burdens laid on it by the States, but questions concerning burdens on interstate commerce are, in the last resort, practical questions calling for acute judicial delineation under the particular facts of a particular case.

Is there truly a practical distinction between the questions underlying the protection against a State's taxing power being used to cripple or destroy the Federal government's power to function in a particular respect, and the questions underlying the protection against a State's taxing power being used to burden interstate commerce, an area under Federal sovereignty?

> "* * * even if it be found that certain transactions in fact constitute interstate commerce, such conclusion does not answer the further inquiry whether a particular assertion of power by a state over such transactions offends the Commerce Clause."
>
> *Central Greyhound Lines* v. *Mealey* (1948) (October Term 1947) 68 S. Ct. 1260, 1265; 92 L. ed. (Adv.) 1235, 1237.

Petitioner submits that the decision of the Court below turns on the finding that interstate commerce was involved. While submitting that the taxable event below was a local event, petitioner urges that likewise, under the above considerations, this cause should be briefed and heard by this Court, and it be determined whether or not, in the instant case, the incidence of the Indiana Gross Income Tax Law places an unlawful burden on the transactions in question.

B

The impact of the tax in this instance bears correct apportionment to interstate commerce

In the instant case, the tax was assessed on the income received by the taxpayer. Uncontradicted evidence below showed that the income received by respondent was

forwarded to him in Indiana by an agent, transportation, sale costs, storage charges, etc. deducted (R. pp. 13, 14, 15). Such income when received by respondent was actually the net amount remaining after the deduction of forwarding charges, commissions, sales expense, etc. (R. pp. 13, 14, 15). The impact of the tax was not on "gross income received from interstate commerce", but for all actual and practical purposes, was only on the net value of taxpayer respondent's goods after the expenses of any out-of-state or interstate activities had been deducted. Therefore, a tax levied on the gross income of respondent received by him in the taxing state, which income included receipts from the sale of farm produce as set forth in the record, was not a discriminatory or burdensome tax upon interstate commerce. Such particular receipts lay within respondent's gross income along with receipts from other sources. The effect of any incidence the tax may have upon the part of respondent's income received from the sales in question places no conceivable, practical burden on interstate commerce.

Petitioner submits that in the facts shown by the record in this case, no rationally drawn distinction within practical consideration would lead one to the conclusion that petitioner taxing state is asserting a power over such a transaction which offends the Commerce Clause. If it should be argued that improper apportionment found discriminatory under a tax levy on Interstate Commerce is unlawful, petitioner urges that in this instance, the complaint, if any, lies more practically with that of petitioner's intrastate activities since the impact of the gross income tax on his sales out-of-state is only on the apportioned activities of the taxpayer within the State of Indiana, and omits from the tax paid portions of the income allocated to the cost of making these sales, in another jurisdiction.

C

By Practical Distinction the Sales Activities of Respondent Taxpayer at Issue Were Local Events; No Others Were Taxed

The first characterization of this tax was by the Supreme Court of Indiana as an excise levied upon those domiciled within the state or who derived income from sources within the state, upon the basis of the privilege of domicile or the privilege of transacting business within the state.

Miles v. *Dept. of Treasury* (1935), 209 Ind. 172, 188, 199 N. E. 372;

Storen v. *J. D. Adams Mfg. Co.* (1937), 212 Ind. 343, 351, 7 N. E. (2d) 941.

Further interpretation of this statute by the Indiana Supreme Court as to the basis of this tax are omitted as they were compelled by the decisions of this Court and are the adoption of this Court's reasoning rather than the independent interpretation of an Indiana court of its own statute.

Ignoring the rule that this Court will ordinarily accept the state court's interpretation of its own law as to the nature and incidence of the tax.

Memphis Nautral Gas Co. v. *Stone* (1948), 68 S. Ct. 1475, 1478, 92 L. Ed. 1409, and cases cited (N. 16);

General Trading Co. v. *State Tax Comm.* (1944), 322 U. S. 335, 337, 88 L. Ed. 1309,

this Court held that this tax is not an excise for the privilege of domicile alone but was a tax upon gross receipts from commerce. The Court there struck down the tax because it was levied indiscriminately upon both the intra-

state activities (manufacturing) and interstate commerce (interstate sales).

J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. *Storen* (1935), 304 U. S. 307, 82 L. Ed. 1365.

It is thus recognized that this tax is levied upon a congeries of activities which may vary in each case according to the particular state of facts to which the tax is to be applied. Thus, in many cases the tax is levied upon gross receipts of non-commercial activities such as subsidies (Regulation 1821); winnings at gambling (Regulation 1812); damages for personal injuries or property damage (Regulation 1808); or prizes or premiums (Regulation 1818). Regulations cited may be found in Appendix A herein, *post.*

This Court's characterization of the tax as one on gross receipts from commerce would certainly not fit those situations. That generalized statement was applied to and limited by the congeries of taxable activities in that particular case which included indiscriminately and without apportionment certain activities in interstate commerce. It is conditioned upon such a congeries of fact and cannot well be applied indiscriminately in an area of "nice distinctions."

Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. *Stone* (1948), 68 S. Ct. 1475, 1478, 92 L. Ed. 1409;

Central Greyhound Lines v. *Mealey* (1948), 68 S. Ct. 1260, 1265, 92 L. Ed. (Adv.) 1235, 1237.

Nor has the court applied this definition of the tax without a nice regard for the interstate and intrastate aspects of the particular aggregate of taxable activities presented by each case. It has sustained or denied the tax consistently with the presence or absence of interstate commerce in the cumulation of taxable activities and has refused to strike down the tax merely because interstate commerce was

present in the totality of both taxable and non-taxable activities.

Thus in—

J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. *Storen* (1938), 304 U. S. 307, 82 L. Ed. 1365, and

Freeman v. *Hewit* (1946), 329 U. S. 249, 91 L. Ed. 265,

the taxable activities were held to include interstate sales while in other cases involving this tax, the cumulation of taxable events was held not to include the interstate commerce present in the fact. See:

Dept. of Treasury v. *Wood Preserving Co.* (1941), 313 U. S. 62, 85 L. Ed. 1188;

Dept. of Treasury v. *Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co.* (1941), 313 U. S. 252, 85 L. Ed. 1313;

Dept. of Treasury v. *Allied Mills* (1942), 220 Ind. 340, Aff'd 1943, 318 U. S. 740, 87 L. Ed. 1120;

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock et al. v. *Dept. of Treasury* (1943), 133 Fed. (2d) 212. Certiorari denied, 320 U. S. 746;

International Harvester Co. v. *Dept. of Treasury* (1944), 322 U. S. 340, 38 L. Ed. 1313.

It is, therefore, necessary to analyze the facts and segregate the congeries of activities upon which Indiana seeks to levy its tax. The taxing act (Section 1 (m), Appendix B, *post*) defines taxable income for the purposes of this case as:

> "* * * the gross receipts of the taxpayer received from trades, businesses or commerce, * * * and the gross receipts received from the sales, transfer, or exchange of property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, * * *".

The facts in this case disclose that the respondent engaged in the business of farming, shipped the products thereof

to market and after the arrival at market, offered them for sale and sold them. That the local business of production is at least a part of the tax base is specified in the statute and is implicit in the decision in *J. D. Adams Mfg. Co.* v. *Storen* (1938), 304 U. S. 307; 82 L. Ed. 1365, where the court held directly that the tax was upon both the local activity of manufacturing and the interstate sale and struck down the tax because of the failure to apportion between them.

The distinction between this case and the *J. D. Adams Mfg. Co.* is that in that case the interstate sale occurred partially within Indiana in that acceptance of the contract and delivery of the goods to the carrier occurred within the state and the interstate sale was thus within the jurisdiction of Indiana to levy the tax. Here, as is elsewhere shown, the sale was wholly extra-state and no part of it occurred in Indiana. The sales were negotiated, contracted, and consummated by delivery entirely outside the state.

In its opinion below, the Court held the tax invalid solely on the basis of a burden on interstate commerce and otherwise affirmed the tax (R. p. 33).

The affirmation of the validity of the tax (aside from the Commerce Clause) could only have been founded upon the premise that the tax was an excise upon the privilege of local domicile or was a tax upon the privilege of receiving gross income from the local business of farming. The Indiana court, however, expressly disaffirmed the former premise and approved the latter by necessary implication. The only activity within the jurisdiction of Indiana and upon which the court could have based the validity of the tax was the business of farming in Indiana.

In this respect, the present case is similar to *Department of Treasury* v. *Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co.* (1941), 313 U. S. 252, 85 L. Ed. 1313, where the taxpayer was in the business of enameling stove parts in Indiana. These parts

were received in Illinois, transported by the taxpayer to its plant in Indiana, redelivered by the taxpayer to the customer in Illinois after being enameled. The single compensation covered both the transportation and the enameling. This Court held that the tax was levied upon the gross receipts from the local business of enameling and that the interstate transportation was merely incidental to that business.

Here, as there, the taxpayer was engaged in a local intrastate business. Here, as there, there was an incidental transportation of the product outside the state. While there was here a local sale of goods in another state, no tax was levied with respect to such sale, but the tax was levied in the alternative upon income received within the state and produced by a local event.

Another proof of the fact that the tax was levied in the instant case upon the respondent's business of farming is that if that business had been located outside the taxing jurisdiction of the state, no tax would have been levied. The definition of gross income specifically excludes receipts from a business having a business situs outside the state. (Section 1 (m) Appendix B, *post.*)

Under this statute it is specifically provided by regulation that the operation of a farm in another state constitutes a business situs for the purpose of exempting the income from that farm from taxation.

Regulation 4100, Rule 4, of the Gross Income Tax Division, is as follows:

> "RECEIPTS FROM BUSINESSES MAINTAINED AND OPERATED WHOLLY OUTSIDE THE STATE. Persons resident and/or domiciled in Indiana who are engaged in business, the legal situs and location of which is in a state other than Indiana, and the activities of such business are carried on in states other than Indiana, will not be required to pay tax upon the gross receipts therefrom.

> For the purpose of this ruling the operation of a farm will be included under the term 'engaged in business'."

Therefore, the single definitive event which determines the taxability or non-taxability of the gross receipts in this case, is the operation of a farm in Indiana. The manner by which those receipts are realized, whether by sales, of product, rental, subsidies, or otherwise is wholly extraneous to the determination of liability. Likewise, the place where these receipts are realized is not determinative of liability. Liability is fixed by statute solely by reason of the operation of the farm in Indiana and is measured by receipts from that operation wherever and however realized.

This case then falls within *American Mfg. Co.* v. *St. Louis* (1919), 250 U. S. 459; 63 L. Ed. 1084. See also, *Utah P. & L. Co.* v. *Pfost* (1932), 286 U. S. 165; 76 L. Ed. 1038; *Memphis Natural Gas Co.* v. *Stone,* (1948), 68 S. Ct. 1475; 92 L. Ed. 1409, where the tax was likewise levied upon a local producing activity and was measured by the gross receipts of that activity.

The respondent's business of farming is carried on in the State of Indiana. It is protected by the laws of this state and served by its agencies. The gross receipts derived from that business are a fair measure of the extent of the activity and thus of the service and protection afforded to the respondent. No other state can tax that activity and Indiana does not seek to tax that activity if carried on in another state. How, then, can this be a tax on, or a regulation of, interstate commerce?

Conclusion

Petitioner respectfully requests the granting of its petition for Writ of Certiorari and a review by this Court of the decision and judgment of the Indiana Supreme Court since the Indiana Supreme Court has held that the gross in-

come tax of the State of Indiana, in the instant case, places an unlawful burden on Interstate Commerce engaged in by the respondent taxpayer. Petitioner earnestly submits that the decision of the Indiana Supreme Court is erroneous for the reasons that:

1. Respondent taxpayer was not engaged in Interstate Commerce while participating in the event which produced the income taxed;

2. The transactions which earned the income sought to be taxed were purely local events either in the foreign state where the income producing sales were transacted, or in the state of the taxpayer's residence, that of petitioner;

3. If interstate commerce may be found to be a part of the transactions in question, the impact of the Indiana Gross Income Tax on such transactions does not create a burden which offends the Commerce Clause.

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APPENDIX A

Indiana Gross Income Regulations Cited

Regulation 1808: Damages.

Money received in settlement of property damage will not be taxable to the extent of the amounts used for replacement within a reasonable length of time, but any amounts not so used must be reported as taxable gross income for taxation at the rate of 1%. (Reg. 2100.)

The entire amount of personal damages or awards either on suit or by compromise or voluntary settlement will be considered taxable gross income and must be included for taxation at the rate of 1%, unless this tax has already been paid by a fiduciary.

Regulation 1812: Gambling.

Money received on account of wager or games of chance will be considered taxable gross income and must be reported for taxation without any reduction on account of losses incurred.

Regulation 1818: Prize Premiums.

Prizes and premiums are named as items of taxable gross income in Sec. 1 (m) and the rate applicable is 1% as "income derived from any source whatsoever"—Sec. 3 (g). The cost of prizes and premiums may be deducted from gross income by the donor.

Regulation 1821: Subsidies.

Subsidies paid to producers and processors by the United States Government under price stabilization plans are considered as income "from any source whatsoever" and taxable at the rate of 1%. Persons receiving such subsidies as agents for the final recipient will not be required to pay tax thereon. Subsidies cannot be considered as gifts, nor as a part of the sale price of produce or processed products.

APPENDIX B

Indiana Gross Income Tax Act—Section 1 (m)

The term "gross income," except as hereinafter otherwise expressly provided, means the gross receipts of the taxpayer received as compensation for personal services, including but not in limitation thereof, wages, bonuses, pensions, salaries, fees, commissions, gratuities, (including the value of living expenses and/or rental quarters furnished to the taxpayer) and the gross receipts of the taxpayer received from trades, businesses, or commerce, including admission fees or charges, and the gross receipts received from the sale, transfer, or exchange, of property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, including the sale of capital assets, or from the assignment or sale of rights, all receipts received from the performance of contracts, all receipts received as prizes and premiums, all receipts received from insurance, all amounts received as alimony, damages, or judgments, and all receipts received by reason of the investment of capital, including but not in limitation thereof, interest, discounts, rentals, royalties, dividends, fees, commissions, and receipts received from the surrender, sale, transfer, exchange, redemption of, or distribution upon, stock of corporations or associations, and all other receipts of any kind or character received from any source whatsoever, and without any deductions on account of the return of capital invested, the cost of the property sold, the cost of materials used, labor cost, interest, discount, or commissions paid or credited, or any other expense whatsoever paid or credited, and without any deductions on account of losses, and without any other deductions of any kind or character: Provided, however, That the term "gross income" shall not include cash discounts allowed and taken on sales; goods, wares or merchandise, or the value thereof, returned by customers when the sale price is refunded either in cash or by credit; nor the receipt of borrowed money, nor the receipt of the repayment thereof, including the receipts from the issuance of bonds or from the redemption thereof; nor judgments for income not taxable under this act; nor amounts received as withdrawal of deposits

so far as they constitute the principal thereof; nor the amounts received by the taxpayer as outright gifts, devises or bequests, but only so far as such amounts represent the corpus of such gifts, devises or bequests; nor the receipt of capital by a corporation, partnership, firm or joint venture, from sale of stock or shares in such corporation, partnership, firm, or joint venture, or contributions to the capital thereof, but proceeds accruing, or proceeding from subsequent transactions in the stock of such corporation or organizations, or in the interest or shares of the members of any organization shall be included in gross income as defined herein: Provided, further, That the term "gross income" shall not include the gross receipts represented by the value of real or tangible personal property received in reciprocal exchange for real or tangible personal property of like kind by and between the owners thereof, to the extent of the value of the property or the interest therein of which title is surrendered; nor the gross receipts represented by the value of stock of a corporation or association received in a reciprocal exchange by and between the owners thereof (including the issuing corporation or association) for stock in the same corporation or association to the extent of the value of such stock or the interest therein of which title is surrendered; nor the gross receipts represented by the value of bonds or similar securities issued by any corporation or association, received in a reciprocal exchange by and between the owners thereof, (including the issuing corporation or association) for bonds or similar securities issued by the same corporation or association, to the extent of the value of such bonds or similar securities or the interest therein of which title is surrendered; nor the gross receipts represented by the value of stocks, bonds, or other securities received in a reciprocal exchange by and between the owners thereof for other stocks, bonds, or other securities or the interest therein of which title is surrendered, where such exchange is made in the course of a consolidation, merger, or other reorganization, and the stocks, bonds, or other securities received in exchange are issued by one or more corporations or associations each of which is a party to such reorganization. The term "exchange" for the purpose of the foregoing proviso means and includes the trans-

fer of title and/or ownership by means of a transaction involving the barter or swap of property acquired previously to the exchange, by and between the owners thereof, with or without additional consideration. "Exchange" shall not be construed to mean or include any sale of property even though other property of any kind is purchased with the proceeds of such sale, nor shall it be construed to mean or include any barter or swap of property where there are more than two parties to the transaction, nor shall the term include any transaction where the property exchanged is acquired by one party to the transaction as a result of negotiation or arrangement with the other party with intent to effectuate an exchange of the property so acquired "Like kind" as used herein shall mean and include only property of the same class and kind, and shall have no reference to the grade or quality of such property. Provided, further, That "gross income" shall not include any amounts received as payment of the principal amount of a note taken in lieu of cash if either the face value of such note has been included in taxable gross income at the time of acceptance, or the note was taken prior to May 1, 1933, or is a renewal thereof, but the receipt of interest payments on such note shall be included: Provided, further, That the face amount of a promissory note or retail installment contract, except so much thereof as represents insurance premiums or finance charges as defined in section 1 of the Retail Installment Sales Act of Indiana, derived from either (1) a sale of tangible personal property in the usual course of business of a retail merchant, or (2) the performance of a contract involving the sale or the furnishing of tangible personal property together with labor or services related thereto, or, (3) the maintenance and repair of automobiles, trucks, tractors, trailers, farm machinery or parts thereof, shall be included in Gross Income and returned under the applicable classification of section 3 hereof; and any amount received in payment of, or from the sale of, such promissory note or Retail Installment contract shall not be included in Gross Income, but so much of said note or Retail Installment contract as represents a finance charge as defined above shall be included in Gross Income if any

when collected. Provided, further, That in case of consignment sales "gross income" shall include the gross receipts from the sale of goods sold on consignment and the tax shall be paid thereon by the consignee: Provided, further, That with respect to individuals resident in Indiana and corporations incorporated under the laws of Indiana authorized to do and doing business in any other state and/or foreign country, the term "gross income" shall not include gross receipts received from sources outside the State of Indiana in cases where such gross receipts are received from a trade or business situated and regularly carried on at a legal situs outside the State of Indiana, or from activities incident thereto (including the disposal of capital assets or other properties which had been theretofore acquired or used in carrying on such trade or business): Provided, further, That it is not the intention by the foregoing language to exclude from the definition of "gross income" any receipts of a taxpayer received as interest or dividends, or from sales, or other receipts received from investments, which investments were acquired and/or disposed of other than in connection with the business in which such taxpayer is regularly engaged, nor shall this exclusion be construed as applying to salaries, wages, bonuses, commissions, or other personal remuneration of any kind or character received by any taxpayer.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1948.

No. 339.

GROSS INCOME TAX DIVISION, STATE OF INDIANA,
Petitioner,

vs.

R. CARL QUICK,
Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

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INDEX.

	Page
Introductory Statement	1
Opinion Below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Petitioner's Reasons for Requesting Writ	2
Petitioner's Statement as to Questions Presented	3
As to Petitioner's Summary Statement	4
Summary of Argument	5
Argument	6
I. The receipts of Respondent in this case have been decided by this Court to be receipts in interstate commerce	6
II. Petitioner's contention that an order prior to shipment of Respondent's livestock to out-of-state markets was necessary to make the sale thereof in such markets interstate commerce is without support of reason or authority	9
III. Petitioner's summary statement is misleading and inaccurate	12
IV. The sales of Respondent's livestock involved in this case are not subject to the Indiana Gross Income Tax	14
V. There was no apportionment	16
Conclusion	17
Appendix A. Exemption Afforded by the Indiana Statute	19

AUTHORITIES CITED AND REFERRED TO.

Cases.

J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen (1938), 304 U. S. 307, 82 L. ed. 1365 ..... 4, 14
Freeman v. Hewit (1946), 329 U. S. 249, 91 L. ed. 265 ..... 4, 14
Gross Income Tax Div. v. Quick (1948), 78 N. E. (2d) Adv. Op. 871 ..... 3, 4
Gwinn, White & Prince v. Henneford (1939), 305 U. S. 424, 83 L. ed. 272 ..... 4, 9, 10
Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell (1934), 200 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413 11
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. (1940), 309 U. S. 33, 84 L. ed. 565 10
Minnesota v. Blassius (1933), 290 U. S. 1, 78 L. ed. 131 15
Stafford v. Wallace (1922), 258 U. S. 495, 66 L. ed. 735 ..... 6, 11, 15
Swift & Co. v. U. S. (1905), 196 U. S. 375, 49 L. ed. 518 ..... 6, 11, 15

Statutes.

Indiana Acts 1933, C. 50, Sec. 1 et seq., as amended, found in Burns' Ann. Stat. 1933, Replacement Vol. 11, 1943, and Sup. 1947, Sec. 64-2601 et seq. 2, 3
Indiana Acts 1933, C. 50, Sec. 6, as amended, found in Burns' Ann. Stat. 1933, Replacement Vol. 11, 1943, and Sup. 1947, Sec. 64-2606 2

Constitution.

United States Constitution, Article I, Sec. 8 2

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Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

The Respondent R. Carl Quick, for his brief in opposition to the granting of a writ of certiorari directed to the Supreme Court of Indiana, respectfully shows that the judgment of said Court was rendered in this cause on the 29th day of April, 1948, affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court for the Forty-first Judicial District of Indiana, after which the petitioner herein filed with the Supreme Court of Indiana its petition for rehearing, which was overruled by said Supreme Court of Indiana on the 25th day of June, 1948.

OPINION BELOW.

Petitioner has made appropriate reference to the opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court, which appears in the printed record (page 33; original record, page 66) and Respondent will not repeat it here.

JURISDICTION.

Title 28, U. S. C., Sections 1257 and 2101, are the governing statutes for the purposes of jurisdiction, if assumed by this Court.

PETITIONER'S REASONS FOR REQUESTING WRIT.

Petitioner is in error in stating the cause is one which draws in question the validity of a statute of the State of Indiana on the ground that such statute is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, particularly Article 1, Section 8. The Indiana Statute (commonly known as Gross Income Tax Act) expressly exempts from taxation receipts derived from Interstate Commerce.

Section 6, Chapter 50, Acts Indiana General Assembly 1933, as amended;
Section 64-2606 (a), Burns' Ann. Stat. 1933 (1943 Replacement, Supplement 1947);
Appendix A, this brief, page 19.

The question litigated in the Courts below involved the unlawful attempt by the Gross Income Tax Division of the State of Indiana to levy and collect a gross receipts tax under the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act on Respondent's constantly recurring sales of live stock in out of state public stockyards, during the year 1940, found to be in fact Interstate Commerce, which Indiana was prohibited from taxing under the terms of its own statute by reason or Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States. Respondent asserts this question has been determined heretofore by this Court and the decision of the Indiana Supreme Court is in full accord with the applicable decisions of this Court.

PETITIONER'S STATEMENT AS TO QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

Neither the record nor the facts disclosed by the record in this case, in any sense, justify such questions as petitioner attempts to propound to the Court under this heading.

A. This question fails to take into consideration the essential elements of Respondent's method and manner of business and the course of the transactions involved in the case at bar, as are clearly set forth in the opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court (R. p. 66, Printed R., p. 33).

B. No attempt is made by the Indiana Supreme Court to extend the prohibition against the tax on the broad grounds suggested by petitioner in this question.

> "We are constrained to hold that **the sale** of the cattle and hogs at the stockyards was but **the ultimate end of the livestock insofar as this appellee** (Respondent here) **was concerned,** and that the transportation **and sale** were both a part of the movement of the same into and through the stream of interstate commerce." (Parenthetical insertion and emphasis ours.)
>
> Opinion Indiana Supreme Court, 78 N. E. (2d) (1948) 871, 873, Advance Sheets.

C. The Indiana Statute (Burns' Ann. Stat. 1933, 1943 Replacement, and 1947 Sup. Vol. 11, Sec. 64-2601 et seq.), known as the Gross Income Tax Act, makes no provision in the levy of gross income tax for apportionment in respect of transactions occurring in more than one state. Therefore, the ipse dixit of the taxing authorities made without sanction of legislative authority cannot sustain the tax in this case as an apportioned tax. It is elementary that such authorities cannot set up their own standards in this respect.

See:

J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen (1938), 304 U. S. 307, 82 L. Ed. 1365, 1369;

Freeman v. Hewit (1945), 329 U. S. 249, 91 L. Ed. 265, 271 (note practice of brokers in deducting commissions and expenses in remitting proceeds of sales);

Gwinn, White & Prince v. Henneford (1939), 305 U. S. 424, 83 L. Ed. 272, 276.

AS TO PETITIONER'S SUMMARY STATEMENT.

In the petitioner's summary statement it appears that it has persisted in its error when it attempts to briefly outline the factual situation both as reflected by the complaint and the evidence.

For a fair, unbiased and disinterested summary of the facts we respectfully refer the Court to the opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court appearing in the record at page 66, printed record, p. 33, and in the unofficial report in the 78 N. E. (2d) page 871 of West's Reporter System.

The evidence given in the cause upon the trial in the original Court below appears in the record beginning at page 30, printed record, p. 11.

Respondent agrees with petitioner that the same Gross Income Tax Act of Indiana has been under consideration in this Court prior to this time, and respectfully submits that the Indiana Supreme Court has made no new application of principles heretofore announced by this Court, nor has it in any way decided a Federal question of substance in any way not in accord with the applicable decisions of this Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

The petition presents but two questions:

(a) Have the questions decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana been heretofore decided by this Court, and, if so,

(b) Were they decided in accord with the decisions of this Court?

I. The receipts which petitioner sought to tax have been decided by this court to be receipts from interstate sales.

II. Petitioner's contention that sales of out of state shipments of livestock by commission men in the stockyards are not sales in interstate commerce, because the shipper had no order prior to their shipment, is without support in reason or authority.

III. Petitioner's summary statement is misleading and inaccurate.

IV. The sales being a part and incident of interstate commerce, the proceeds thereof are not subject to the Indiana Gross Income Tax.

V. There was no apportionment.

ARGUMENT.

The petition is without merit, and the writ should be denied.

The propositions set forth under the headings in the petition "The Reasons for Requesting Writ," "Questions Presented," and "Reasons for Granting Writ" present, in fact, but two questions. These questions are those tendered by numbers I and II under the heading "Reasons for Granting Writ," it being thereby contended that the questions decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana have not been heretofore determined by this court and that such questions have not been determined in accord with the applicable decisions of this court. If the questions under consideration have, in fact, been heretofore determined by this court, it is not necessary that the same questions be again settled, as contended in reason IV, and, if such questions have been determined by the Supreme Court of Indiana in accord with the applicable decisions of this court, it follows as a matter of course that it has determined such questions correctly and not in a way that is untenable as contended in reason III.

I.

That the very receipts, which the petitioner here sought to tax, are the proceeds of sales effected in interstate commerce has been squarely decided by this court in Swift and Company v. United States (1905), 196 U. S. 375, 49 L. Ed. 518, and Stafford v. Wallace (1922), 258 U. S. 495, 66 L. Ed. 735. It is the petitioner's theory that when respondent's cattle and hogs were sold by commission men, to whom he had consigned them in the stockyards in Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Buffalo, these transactions constituted local sales in those respective states. It in-

sists that interstate commerce had terminated, that the livestock had come to rest, and that the sales were in all respects separate and distinct from the transportation of the livestock from one state into another and did not partake of its character. In the Swift case this court was called upon to determine whether or not sales of livestock, made in the very manner in which the sales here under consideration were made and in the very yards where these sales were effected, constituted interstate commerce within the meaning of the federal constitution. It was there said by Mr. Justice Holmes in language quoted by the Supreme Court of Indiana in its opinion:

> "When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another, and when in effect they do so, with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stock yards, and when this is a typical, constantly recurring course, the current thus existing is a current of commerce among the States, and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce."

The soundness of this court's conclusions in the Swift case was challenged in Stafford v. Wallace, where it was again contended, as petitioner contends here, that livestock, shipped to commission men in the stockyards, there came to rest and that sales made by these commission men in the stockyards were to be separated from the interstate transportation of the livestock which were the subject of the sales and were purely local transactions. In an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Taft this court adhered to the conclusions arrived at in the Swift case and said:

> "The principles of the Swift case have become a fixed rule of this court in the construction and application of the commerce clause."

It was further said:

> "The stockyards are not a place of rest or final destination. Thousands of head of livestock arrive daily by carloads and trainload lots, and must be promptly sold and disposed of and moved out to give place to the constantly flowing traffic that presses behind. The stockyards are but a throat through which the current flows, and the transactions which occur therein are only incident to this current from the West to the East, and from one state to another. Such transactions cannot be separated from the movement to which they contribute, and necessarily take on its character. The commission men are essential in making the sales without which the flow of the current could be obstructed, and this, whether they are made to packers or dealers. The dealers are essential to the sales to the stock farmers and feeders. The sales are not, in this aspect, merely local transactions. They create a local change of title, it is true, but they do not stop the flow; they merely change the private interests in the subject of the current, not interfering with, but, on the contrary, being indispensable to, its continuity. The origin of the live stock is in the West; its ultimate destination, known to, and intended by, all engaged in the business, is in the Middle West and East, either as meat products or stock for feeding and fattening. This is the definite and well-understood course of business. The stockyards and the sales are necessary factors in the middle of this current of commerce."

In view of the language of this court which we have quoted, spoken with respect to transactions identical with those here under consideration, petitioner's contention that the question as to whether or not the sales of respondent's livestock were made in interstate commerce has not been

heretofore determined by this court is wholly without merit. Of course, its contention that respondent's livestock had come to rest in the stockyards and that the sales which were there made were local transactions which were in no sense a part of interstate commerce is equally untenable.

II.

The petitioner contends that if the respondent had had prior orders for the sale of his livestock the proceeds derived therefrom would be immune from the Indiana gross income tax, but that, in the absence of such prior orders, interstate commerce was not involved in the sales. It is true that in the Adams and Freeman cases orders for the sale of the machinery and securities respectively there involved had been obtained prior to their shipment from Indiana, although, as to Freeman, it does not appear that he knew, or was concerned with, the identity of those who were to purchase his securities on the stock exchange. As was said by the Supreme Court of Indiana in the instant case, however, there is nothing in the Adams case (and there was nothing in the Freeman case) that would in any way limit interstate commerce to cases where prior orders are used. That a sale by a commission man in the stockyards is not rendered a local transaction by reason of the absence of an order for such sale prior to the shipment of the livestock from another state, of course, clearly appears from the Swift and Stafford cases. There is not a word in any opinion of this court to support the distinction, which petitioner attempts to draw, to the effect that a sale of a commodity shipped from one state into another pursuant to a prior order constitutes interstate commerce while a sale made upon the arrival at a stockyards or stock exchange of livestock or securities shipped there for sale from without the state constitutes a purely local transaction. It will be noted that in Gwinn, White &

Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 83 L. Ed. 272, the gross receipts derived by the appellant from the marketing of fruit shipped from Washington to places of sale in other states and foreign countries was held not subject to the gross receipts tax of the State of Washington, without regard to whether the fruit was shipped directly by the growers to the purchasers or consigned to the appellant at extra-state points from which it was diverted by appellant to purchasers who bought the fruit while in transit or where it was stored pending sale.

The precise distinction which the petitioner seeks to draw was advanced and rejected by this court in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Company, 309 U. S. 33, 84 L. Ed. 565, 575, where it is said:

> "Respondent, pointing to the course of its business and to its contracts which contemplate the shipment of the coal interstate upon orders of the New York customers, insists that a distinction is to be taken between a tax laid on sales made, without previous contract, after the merchandise had crossed the state boundary, and sales, the contracts for which when made contemplate or require the transportation of merchandise interstate to the taxing state . . . But we think this distinction is without the support of reason or authority."

It is apparently the theory of the petitioner that, notwithstanding these expressions of this court, should, for instance, a dog fancier agree upon the sale of a dog to a purchaser in another state, and, pursuant to such agreement, cause the animal to be transported to the purchaser and receive in due course the proceeds of the sale, the transaction would be an interstate one, for which the commerce clause would have a particular and jealous concern, and the proceeds of which would be immune from

taxation by the seller's state; but that the great current of transportation of cattle from the ranges of the west to the stockyards in the terminal markets, their sale in those markets to feeders in the corn belt; the transportation of cattle and hogs back from the farms to the market and their sale in those markets to packers and shippers, all conducted through the medium of commission men and dealers, according to the long and well established usage, result in no sales in interstate commerce, but in local transactions, the proceeds of which the states of the sellers may tax without limit and at will. Consideration should be given to the object sought to be attained and the mischief sought to be prevented by the commerce clause of the constitution. We apprehend that no such distinction as is here sought to be drawn existed in the minds of those who framed the constitution, but that, conscious of the diversified interests of the original states, they sought to prohibit any state from obstructing the free flow of raw materials from the states where they were produced to the states which were prepared to transform them into manufactured articles, of manufactured goods from the industrial states to agricultural areas and of grain and livestock from those sections which produced them in abundance to those states which, even then, were dependent on their neighbors for that which they consumed. Bearing in mind the words of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall quoted in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 200 U. S. 398, 443, 78 L. Ed. 413, 431, "We must never forget that it is a **constitution** we are expounding—a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs," and to the language of Mr. Justice Holmes in the Swift case, quoted by Mr. Chief Justice Taft in the Stafford case—"Commerce among the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business," and giving heed to the highly complex economic

system which exists today, it is manifest that the current of livestock flowing in its accustomed way from range and farm into and through these federally regulated stockyards, and supplying from day to day the very life blood of the nation, is a current of interstate commerce, which, at least as much as any other commercial intercourse, is not subject to obstruction or interference by the states.

III.

We are constrained to suggest that petitioner's summary statement is inaccurate and misleading, and its representation as to the facts is in many respects unsupported by the evidence. It attempts to limit the respondent's business activities to those of a mere farmer, while in Paragraph 1 of the stipulation it appears that he is engaged, not only in the business of farming, but in dealing in and the raising and selling of livestock, and in Paragraph 5 it appears that in the year in controversy he made 136 separate shipments of livestock aggregating in value $220,268.14. He shipped no other "farm produce." Petitioner recites that the livestock were transported with "no buyer in sight," that they were "received and held at the destination with the title still in respondent, subject to the control, use, or disposition of taxpayer and/or his agents" and that the sale "occurred at a subsequent time and after an elapsed interval, during which buyers were sought and offers solicited." This is an attempt to make commerce a purely "technical legal conception" and not a "practical one, drawn from the course of business." Buyers are always present at the stockyards. Indeed, the identity of the particular purchaser of livestock at these great terminal yards is of no consequence. So far as the current of commerce is concerned, cattle and hogs are shipped, not primarily to any individual buyer nor even to any particular commission man. They are shipped to a livestock market, existing and subject to regulation pursuant to the

laws of Congress, and the commission men are but an instrumentality of that market which affords the conduit through which the current of livestock flows from the ranges to the feed lots and from the feed lots to the packers. The respondent's livestock were not "held" in the stockyards except, as was said in the Swift case, for "the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stockyards," and, in view of the typical and constantly recurring course of respondent's business the flow of his shipments and sales was a current of commerce among the states, and the purchase of his cattle was a part and incident of the interstate commerce.

It cannot accurately be said that respondent's livestock were sold at a "subsequent time" or "after an elapsed interval." They moved into the yards, and through the pens and into the possession of the purchaser in a continuous flow, to which any "elapsed interval" was a mere incident. The suggestion on page 7 of petitioner's brief that respondent, after "depositing" his stock in an out of state market, "there elected" to make the sales which produced the income sought to be taxed finds no support in the record. The election to make the sales was made, not in the yards, but prior to the time when the livestock were loaded into cars or trucks. They were shipped to market for one purpose, and for one purpose only, and that was for the purpose of sale in the markets which were maintained to absorb them. Whether or not the respondent would have had the technical right to dispose of his livestock other than by sale in the stockyards after they had there arrived is of no consequence. He shipped them to market for the purpose of sale on the market. That purpose was never altered in any of the 136 separate transactions which gave rise to the receipts which the petitioner seeks to tax. The transactions were typical of transactions in the yards and were constantly recurring,

and any speculation as to what he might have done, but never did, does not affect the interstate character of these transactions.

IV.

It is, of course, true that the Swift and Stafford cases, holding that sales in all respects identical with the sales, the receipts from which are here sought to be taxed, are not local transactions, but are a part and incident of interstate commerce, do not decide the further question as to whether or not the tax here sought to be imposed is a burden upon such commerce. We recognize that those cases involved respectively the application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to practices there under consideration and the validity of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921. The court was called upon to decide, however, whether sales, such as were made by the respondent in the instant case, constituted interstate commerce and the affirmative answer of the court to that question settled the character of the transactions here under consideration. Interstate commerce is interstate commerce whether the question arises in connection with a determination of the regulatory power of Congress or in connection with the validity of a tax sought to be imposed by a state.

It being settled by the Swift and Stafford cases that the receipts which the petitioner seeks to tax were derived from sales in interstate commerce, it necessarily follows from the decisions of this court in J. D. Adams Manufacturing Company v. Storen et al., 304 U. S. 307, 82 L. Ed. 1365, and Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249, 91 L. Ed. 265, that the tax in question, being a tax imposed by the state of the seller on the proceeds of interstate sales, violates the commerce clause and cannot be enforced.

We shall not prolong our discussion by a reference to the many cases cited by the petitioner which have to do

with taxes imposed by states other than Indiana, under laws far different from the Indiana gross income tax, and upon transactions very different from those here involved. This court, having declared invalid a tax imposed by Indiana on interstate sales, the question is settled and what has been decided with respect to other taxes, levied by other states, under other laws, and upon other transactions is quite beside the point. We should perhaps mention, however, the case of Minnesota v. Blasius (1933), 290 U. S. 1, 78 L. Ed. 131, which happens to involve a property tax on livestock while they were in the possession of their owner in the stockyards in South St. Paul. The case does not sustain the respondent's contention. Blasius had purchased the cattle in the stockyards from commission men to whom they had been consigned from other states. They were confined in pens which he had leased from the stockyards company, and he was offering them for sale on the day on which property was assessed for taxation in Minnesota. In holding that these cattle were subject to the property tax, this court said:

> "The original shipment was not suspended; it was ended. That shipment was to the South St. Paul stockyards for sale on that market. That transportation had ceased and the cattle were sold on that market to Blasius, who became absolute owner and was free to deal with them as he liked—they were not in transit. Their situs was in Minnesota where they had come to rest."

The tax there upheld was not imposed upon the receipts from the sale of the cattle, nor was it imposed by the state from which they had been shipped. It was an ordinary property tax assessed against their owner after the cattle had not only arrived in the stockyards, but had been there sold. It has no application to the instant case. As is held in the Swift and Stafford cases, respondent's

cattle had not ended their transit until after their sale, and they were not at rest while in the custody of the commission men during the interval between their arrival at the yards and their sale to the purchasers.

V.

The petitioner finally contends, as we understand its argument, that by reason of the fact that transportation, sale, and yardage charges were deducted from the price which the purchasers paid for the livestock and only the balance remitted to respondent, there was such an apportionment of the tax as prevented it from offending the commerce clause of the constitution. In the first place, the argument does violence to the facts. The transportation charges were not uniformly deducted, because, with respect to shipments made by truck, the same were either made by respondent in his own truck or transportation charges were paid by him (Printed Record, 14, 15). This argument, of course, concedes that the sales were interstate sales, but takes the position that no part of the proceeds thereof, which was actually received by the respondent, accrued to him by reason of such sale, but resulted solely from activities within the State of Indiana, and that there has consequently been some kind of forced "apportionment." Of course, the statute makes no provision for apportionment. Even if it had, and such an apportionment had, in fact, been made, we are not clear that, in view of the construction placed upon the majority opinion in the Freeman case by Mr. Justice Rutledge in his concurring opinion, such facts would have rendered the tax a valid one. However, there is not only no provision in the law for an apportionment, but there was not in fact any apportionment at all. Petitioner's argument is manifestly absurd. Otherwise Indiana could tax at will the entire proceeds of every sale of commodities shipped by its citi-

zens across its borders save and except only that portion of the same which was consumed in selling and transportation costs. The J. D. Adams Manufacturing Company would have been liable for the tax on the proceeds of its out-of state sales, save only that portion of such proceeds which was applied to freight charges and the cost of selling. Freeman would have been liable for a tax upon the entire proceeds derived from the sale of his securities, save only that proportion of the same which was consumed by charges for postage and brokers' commissions.

We submit, in conclusion, that the questions sought to be presented are not open questions, but settled questions; that under the authority of the Swift and Stafford cases the respondent's sales were interstate sales and that under the authority of the Adams and Freeman cases the proceeds therefrom derived are not subject to the tax sought to be imposed upon them. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana was in all respects in accord with these ruling precedents of this Honorable Court, and the writ should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX A.

Indiana Gross Income Tax Act—Section 6 (a).

Exemptions.

There shall be excepted from gross income tax under this act:

"(a) So much of such gross income as is derived from business involved in commerce between this state and other states of the United States, or between this state and foreign countries, but only to the extent to which the State of Indiana is prohibited from taxing such gross income by the Constitution of the United States of America • • •".

Acts of Indiana General Assembly, 1933, Chapter 50, Section 6;
Acts of 1937, Chapter 117, Section 6;
Acts of 1943, Chapter 144, Section 2;
Acts of 1945, Chapter 143, Section 2;
Burns' Annotated Statutes, 1933, Replacement 1943, Supplement 1947, Section 64-2606.